



! A; MDJ " JAN ' FAQLAN

Jonmichael Hands, Secretary CDI, Member IEEE SISWG

The current state of storage security...

“We shred everything”



Data leak



Encryption



Trust



Policies & Risk



Privacy



2XzJ
zìXXä Xǎǒ



Security

The future state of storage security...

“We lead in circularity”



Robotics for
Recovery



Encryption &
Sanitization



Trust
Assurance



Policies for Risk
Mgmt



EJ §X
>XJ X



Update Legal
Agreements

Mobilizing the Industry

Cooperate - Innovate - Educate - Mobilize



; Jïöä Xiî | Äî
, ©XiîN' Xiî
\$çä ê§öXi #iJãTî
8 (5 î
.A &î
>XNç¶Xi©; Jïöä Xiî

Best Practices

Sanitization
GHG Reduction
Circulatory Processes

Alliances

IEEE SISWG
OCP Security, Storage, and
Sustainability
SNIA
SERI
International Data Sanitization
Consortium

Standards

Data Security
Cryptography
Sanitization
Data Privacy & Protection

Reporting

GHG Reduction
Landfill Diversion
Value Recovery
Resource Efficiency

Verification

Security
Erasure
Companies
Grading

CDI Projects



- Media Sanitization
 - Guidelines
 - Training
- Health Grading Tool
 - Alpha working
- Academic Research
 - Media sanitization
 - Health grading
 - Carbon impact (MSFT)
- Carbon accounting
- Alliances – OCP, SNIA, IEEE, Adisa

CDI Security, Cryptography, Sanitization, Verification



IEEE 2883 Purge
Media Sanitization



IEEE 2883 Verification



.?8 -(\$ □ ° % %
\$ Xi f ` N ö X ç Z
? J ã Ä ™ f ç ã



Hardware roots of trust
Firmware audits
Forensic Analysis



CDI Media Sanitization



Use IEEE 2883 approved
purge technique

Check Sanitize Log


Perform verification on
host interface

Final verification
and reporting

Roadmap – Increase Trust



Vendor validation of
sanitize



Certifications, TCG
OPAL, FIPS 140-3



3rd party audit





Firmware attestation /
measurement,
hardware roots of trust

Roadmap - OCP



Introducing: OCP L.O.C.K.

- A project to deliver an open implementation at CHIPS Alliance, leveraging and following Caliptra
- Scoped specifically to storage devices
- Provides key management services to the drive and host, utilizing services from Caliptra



OCP S.A.F.E. Update

Caliptra Roadmap



Stay tuned for Architecture details by OCP Global Summit 2024



Project Caliptra Update

- ! . * - !)

! 9DALJ9 →) + .) = Q + 9F9? = E = FL
 IQ; C → 11GI9? = ! GFLIGD; J \$AE O9J =
 → #1 ! JQHIG#F? A =

CDI Health Grading Tool

- H=F KGM; = KGOO9J= KMA= >GJ 11" 9F< &" "
 @9ID@9F< J=DA: AAQ

- Transparency required to build trust in secondhand market
- CDI workgroup deep understanding of SSD and HDD quality and reliability
- Grading system designed to accurately assess the health and remaining use left
- Includes endurance, power on hours, errors, device self-test, signed vendor firmware

Circular Drive Initiative | Grading Tool

Devices: 11 Jobs: 0

DEVICES JOBS REPORTS CONSOLE

Refresh Grade All Grade Selected Hex Blink Filter Search for Devices...

#	DUT	STATE	TYPE	TRAN	VENDOR	MODEL NUMBER	SERIAL NUMBER	F/W	GB	B/S	PoH	SMART	HEALTH	REMARKS
1	/dev/sda	Ready	SSD	ATA	SPCC	SOLID STATE DISK	BA1B0795065300893008	SBFM61.3	1024 GB	512	34571	OK		
2	/dev/sdb	Ready	HDD	ATA	WDC	WD40EFRX-68WT0N0	WD-WCC4E2066620	80.00A80	4000 GB	512	66042	OK		
3	/dev/sdc	Ready	HDD	ATA	WDC	WD40EFRX-68N32N0	WD-WCC7K1XF1DJ	82.00A82	4000 GB	512	39067	OK		
4	/dev/sdd	Ready	HDD	ATA	WDC	WD2000F9YZ-09N20L1	WD-WCC1P759C355	01.01A02	2000 GB	512	64368	OK		
5	/dev/sde	Ready	HDD	ATA	WDC	WD2000F9YZ-09N20L1	WD-WMCS0D4AD25	01.01A02	2000 GB	512	56987	OK		
6	/dev/sdf	Ready	HDD	SCSI	Not Reported	NOT REPORTED	001449EJG68X	PCJL36VX	Not Reported	4000 GB	512	15634	OK	97% 8 Reallocated Sectors 3 Offline Uncorrectable Errors
7	/dev/sdg	Fail	HDD	SCSI	Not Reported	NOT REPORTED	001449EL36VX	PCJL36VX	Not Reported	4000 GB	512	15763	OK	70% 16008 Reallocated Sectors 72 Offline Uncorrectable Errors
8	/dev/sdh	Ready	HDD	SCSI	Not Reported	NOT REPORTED	Z126KYH70000W5155834	Not Reported	4000 GB	512	70725	OK	100%	
9	/dev/sdi	Fail	HDD	ATA	WDC	WD2000F9YZ-09N20L1	WD-WMCS0D54320	01.01A02	2000 GB	512	56457	OK		2170 Unusable Sectors
10	/dev/sdj	Ready	HDD	ATA	SEAGATE	ST2000VX000-1CU164	S1E2P9JH	CV22	2000 GB	512	70607	OK		
11	/dev/sdk	Ready	HDD	ATA	SEAGATE	ST2000DM006-2DM164	Z505H23F	CC26	2000 GB	512	39470	OK		

Exit Settings Manual About

13:47:14 2024-05-24

Seagate / openSeaChest

<> Code Issues 27 Pull requests Discussions Actions Projects Security

openSeaChest Public Watch 23 Fork 60 Starred 441

develop Go to file Code About

vonericssen feat: Finish more_utilities c512193 · 2 months ago

- .github ci: Removing mend SAST sc... last year
- Make feat: Adding openSeaChest... 2 months ago
- docs doc: Updating to newer gen... 2 months ago
- example quick: Removing the built bi... 2 years ago
- include doc: Updating to newer gen... 2 months ago
- meson_crosscompile make: Adding musl cross co... last year

Cross platform utilities useful for performing various operations on SATA, SAS, NVMe, and USB storage devices.

ide ssd hdd nvme sata
 scsi ata storage-device
 seagate hdd-health
 usb-interface openseachest-utilities

Readme View license

Data Sanitization Research

! GE HM = + 9?9RA = 9JLAD

- Storage market, intro to circular economy
- History of media sanitization specs
 - Show that DoD and NIST are old
- Highlight new IEEE 2883-2022 spec
- Review purge techniques



New IEEE Media Sanitization Specification Enables Circular Economy for Storage

Jonmichael Hands¹, Chia Network
Tom Coughlin², Coughlin Associates

Modern media sanitization techniques can securely eliminate data on digital storage devices. This enables more effective efforts to reuse and recycle these devices, enabling a circular economy for data storage.

Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MC.2022.3218364
Date of current version: 9 January 2023

COMPUTER 0018-9162/23/020231IEEE

PUBLISHED BY THE IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY JANUARY 2023 III

Data growth has exploded, creating amazing opportunities and enabling quality of life improvements. The amount of data being created has far outpaced the amount of data being stored, with the International Data Corporation (IDC) forecasting that, in 2026, the massive 20.5 ZB of data being stored in the world will make up only about 10% of the total data generated that year (see Figure 1). This growth of stored data needs to be sustainable, with more companies than ever involved in the storage of digital data setting net-zero emission goals by 2030.

RAPID DATA GROWTH DEMANDS SUSTAINABLE PRACTICES

A modern high-capacity 3.5-in hard drive has an environmental footprint of 2.55 kg CO₂ emitted per terabyte per year.² One study estimated the embedded carbon from manufacturing solid-state drives (SSDs) to be as high as 0.16 kg CO₂ emitted

CDI Health Grading – Academic Paper



From Waste to Resource: How Standardized Health Metrics Can Accelerate the Circular Economy in Storage Media

- Background on how HDDs and SSDs fail
- Designing systems for high durability with used drives
- Importance of media sanitization
- Results from Interact – 117k drives decommissioned and sanitized
- 87% suitable for reuse



A Call for Research on Storage Emissions

Carnegie Mellon University, Microsoft Azure


- Storage accounts for **33%** of operational and **61%** of embodied emissions in Azure DCs
- LCAs leveraging IMEC and Makersite (its likely much worse)
- Suggest extension of use and second life as ways to reduce impact

Operational Emissions	CPU	DRAM	SSD	HDD	Other
Compute Rack	42%	18%	19%	0%	21%
SSD Rack	32%	8%	38%	1%	21%
HDD Rack	26%	5%	7%	41%	21%


Table 2: Operational emission breakdown for Azure rack types.

Embodied Emissions	CPU	DRAM	SSD	HDD	Other
Compute Rack	4%	40%	30%	0%	26%
SSD Rack	1%	9%	80%	1%	9%
HDD Rack	2%	11%	14%	41%	33%

Table 3: Embodied emission breakdown for Azure racks.



Increase of areal density on HDD helps but performance challenges






Source: [Hotcarbon](https://www.hotcarbon.com)

Carbon Accounting



The problem

- SSD carbon scales with capacity
- Apple 2023 sustainability report – carbon from iPhone flash only is **59.88g/GB**
- at 517EB in 2024, rough math is **31MMT CO2e**



Source: Forward Insights SSD Insights Q2'24

29FFM1 9F<, 9A . (. □□□□ 2@<AIQK; J-LG>KK#E: G<A<
; 9J: CF 9J6ANG? NAD: D-9L @LHK. 9JPANG? 9: K□□□□□□□□



Backup

IEEE 2883-2022



Standard for Sanitizing Storage

- ~~DAF~~ ~~A~~<MKJQGF L=JE ~~A~~FGIG? Q9F< E G<=JF
E =L@<K9F< L; @FA MFK>GJ E =<A K9FAAR9LAGF
- 5 @LAKK9FAAR9LAGF HIG, =KKGJ E =L@< IG
J=F<=J9; ; =KKIGL9J?=L<9L9 GF KIGJ9?=E =<A
A>9KA D>GJ 9 ? A=F D=N=DG>=MGJL
- " =>A=K19FAAR9LAGF + =L@<K9F< 2=; @FA MFK
>GJ KH; AA E =<A IQH. &" " 11" GHLA9D
J=E GN: D =L;
- 1H; AAKAL=J>9; =KH; AA L; @FA MFK 1 2
1 1 , 4+= @A @Q>G; MK< GF MKA? L@= K9FAAR=
; GE E 9F<
- 29J?=L9DIG? A9D9F< HQKA9DQ; 9LAGFK>GJ <9L9
~ A; DAFA? MK=J<9L9 GB<9L9 E =I9<9L9
GN=JHJGNKAGFA? " =>A=K@KLE =L@<K>GJ
N=JA9LAGF G>K9FAAR9LAGF



Media Sanitization Methods



Clear

*G? A9DL=; @FAMK9J= 9HHA< IG9DD<<J=KK9: D KIGJ9?= D; 9LAGFK HJGL=; LA? 9?9AKLKA HD FGF ANKAN= <9I9 J=; GN=JQL=; @FAMK



" =KJML

Makes data recovery nearly impossible but results in the storage media becoming unusable.

Disintegrate, Incinerate, and Melt



Purge

Logical or physical techniques rendering data recovery infeasible even with state-of-the-art laboratory techniques.


The goal of purge is to maintain the storage media and device in **reusable** state.

Purge Media Sanitization Techniques



- ~~N525~~

Using interface specific sanitize command, overwrite all LBAs with a fixed pattern, minimum of one pass. Multiple pass optional, but is not required anymore.



Block Erase

Use NAND erase blocks, can sanitize a modern SSD in a few seconds to a few minutes.

Doesn't waste NAND endurance, but verification requires no-deallocate.



Crypto Erase

Requires that the devices supports encryption. Sanitize by deleting the media encryption key (MEK), leaving all the data scrambled.

Very fast, completes in seconds.

Verification



Why Verify?

- Prove compliance with policies
- Assure data breach prevention
- Build trust with stakeholders

Verification Methods (IEEE 2883):

- Clear: Representative sampling (at least 5% of addressable space)
- Purge: Full verification (entire addressable space) recommended
- Destruct: Physical inspection ONLY

" G, ME =FL9LGF

- 0=; GJ< C=HF? AK; JM ADO@G O@F O@L
- 1/3 =JLA9L= G>19FAA9LGF 1/3 '1-. '#! □□□□.
- ! GE HDPAAK
- , =O=JL=; @FGIG? AKE 9Q@N= HGKL K9FAA= J=9< =JJGJK
- ! JQHIG=J9K= D9N=K; AH@JL=PL FGLHD9AL=PL
- , GF 9<<J=KK9: D KH9; =FGLN=JAA: D I@GM @@GLAL=J9; = MD? 2JMKL
- \$AE O9J=9M=AK: QE 9FM9; IM=JK
- 4=JAA9LGF G>K9FAA=; GE E 9F< =P=; MAF
- \$MDN=JAA9LGF O@J= >9KA D

IEEE 2883.1




Recommended Practice for Use of Storage Sanitization Methods

- Storage Lifecycle, Risk and Management, Cryptography
- Choosing the Appropriate Sanitization Method: (clear, purge, or destruct) based on the intended use of the storage media, considering factors like risk and the sensitivity of the information
- Verification of Sanitization: Knowing that the data is gone

Storage Lifecycle

Sanitization in the storage lifecycle

- ; I M ~~KAGF~~
- . JGN ~~KAGF~~ A?
- ; L ~~A~~ = 3 K
- #F < G >! MJ = FL 3 K
- 0 = HJGN ~~KAGF~~ A? >GJ J = MK
- " ~~A~~ 9J < 0 =; Q D



#P9E HD≠ G>* AC=DA@GG< G>" 9L9 0=; GN=JQ
 9O=J 19FAAR9LAGF



Sanitization Method	Adversary Capability		
	Novice	Expert	Virtuoso
None	Almost Certain	Almost Certain	Almost Certain
Clear	Unlikely	Likely	Almost Certain
Purge	Almost Impossible	Almost Impossible	Unlikely
Destruct	Almost Impossible	Almost Impossible	Almost Impossible

Risk and Risk Management



- Classify data based on data sensitivity: low, medium, and high
- Interest=f(Gain, WorkFactor, LikelihoodOfSuccess)
- Managing risk: Accept, Avoid, Transfer, Treat/Mitigate

Table 4—Risk as a function of likelihood and magnitude of loss

Likelihood of Retrieving Meaningful Data	Magnitude of Loss		
	Low	Medium	High
Almost certain	Medium	High	Very High
Likely	Low	Medium	High
Unlikely	Very Low	Low	Low
Almost impossible	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low

Cryptography in Storage

Encryption for Data Protection

- **Symmetric Encryption:** Same key for encrypting and decrypting (e.g. AES-XTS). Used for bulk storage due to efficiency.
- **Two Key Types:**
 - **Media Encryption Key (MEK):** The key that directly encrypts your data.
 - **Key Encryption Key (KEK):** Protects the MEK, allows for secure key changes.



Cryptographic Erase: The Sanitization Power Tool



Cryptographic Erase: Not Just Deletion

- **Principle:** Destroying the encryption keys makes the data practically unrecoverable.
- **Advantages:** Extremely fast, strong sanitization assurance (under certain conditions).
- **Conditions for Use:**
 - All data is encrypted.
 - Strong algorithm (at least 128-bit, 256-bit for high security).
 - High entropy keys (hard to guess).
 - All copies of the keys are destroyed.



The Future of Encryption: Quantum Considerations



Cryptographic Algorithm Lifetime

- **Algorithm Lifetime:** Cryptographic methods have a lifespan due to math advancements and computing power.
- **Quantum Threat:** Quantum computing may break current algorithms in the future.
- **Relevance for Sanitization:** Long-lived data might be vulnerable if an attacker stores ciphertext until a better attack is possible.
- **Recommendation:** Consider this for high-value, long-term data, but it's less of a concern for most everyday use cases.

Choosing the Right Sanitization Method




Mitigating Risk: The Sanitization Imperative

- **Goal:** Align data removal with your organization's risk tolerance.
- **Factors:** Consider economic and environmental impacts.
- **Clear:** Affects user-accessible data. Best for low risk data, internal reuse.
- **Purge:** Affects all data, including hidden areas. Best for almost all use cases.
- **Destruct:** Physically destroys the storage media. Best for storage that is obsolete, or no longer operable (broken)

Sanitization Before Provisioning

Supply Chain Threats: Don't Assume Trust

- **Threat:** Compromised supply chains, pre-installed malware, stolen encryption keys.
- **Risk:** Unauthorized access, data exfiltration.
- **Mitigation:** Sanitize storage **BEFORE** it enters your system. Generate new encryption keys.



Sanitization Before Internal Reuse

Internal Threats: Curiosity and Malice

- **Threat:** Curious employees, malicious insiders.
- **Risk:** Data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information.
- **Mitigation:** Match sanitization level to data sensitivity. Clear for low risk, Purge for high risk.



Sanitization Before External Reuse

External Threats: A Wider Landscape

- **Threat:** A broad range of actors with varying motivations and capabilities.
- **Risk:** Data breaches, competitive disadvantage, potential for deep forensic analysis.
- **Mitigation:** Purge is generally recommended due to increased exposure. Clear may suffice for low-risk data.



